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Discovery Reform Redux 
CARL TOBIAS0 
The recent resolve of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules to 
revisit reform of the discovery rules, which the Supreme Court revised as 
recently as 1993, is replete with ironies. In August, 1998, that Committee, 
which has primary responsibility for studying the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and developing suggestions for their improvement, published 
proposals that would significantly revise the substantial 1993 revisions of 
the discovery rules.1 Ironies suffuse many specific aspects of the rule revi-
sion process and of the proposals to revise the 1993 revisions less than five 
years after their implementation. I emphasize the proposal to revise man-
datory automatic disclosure, which requires that litigants exchange im-
portant information before formal discovery. This procedure has been 
controversial, although several other proposed revisions would signifi-
cantly change discovery and are similarly ironic. 
I. THE RULE REVISION PROCESS 
Numerous ironies attend the nascent phase of the protracted rule revi-
sion process that will be the second major test of the rule revision proce-
dures that Congress instituted a decade ago. For example, the rule revisors 
clearly ignored the astute admonitions of two former Advisory Committee 
reporters, additional distinguished legal scholars and experienced practi-
tioners that most rule revisions require a generation of practical applica-
tion before their efficacy can be judged fairly.2 The rule revisors corre-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, Unh'erslly of Ne-.·ada, Las Jegas. I wish to 
thank Mary Berkheiser and Peggy Sanner for l 0aluable suggestions and Eleanor Davison for proc-
essing this piece. Errors that remain are mine. 
I. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 18 (1998) [herein-
after Proposed Amendments]. 
2. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Obsen·atlons Concerning CM/ Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 
39, 52-53 (1967) (citing Benjamin Kaplan's view of generation time period for analyzing rules); 
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spondingly disregarded the remonstrations of a growing chorus of critics 
who have urged that rule revision occur less frequently and have even 
called for moratoria on revision and procedural change.3 Indeed, if the 
proposed discovery revisions traverse the extensive rule revision gauntlet 
and become effective, they would constitute the fourth important package 
of discovery revisions since 1980. 
At least, the Advisory Committee apparently remembered the earlier, 
unfortunate experiences with the 1983 revision of Rule 11, which required 
that judges sanction lawyers and litigants who failed to conduct reasonable 
pre-filing inquiries, and the 1993 revision of Rule 26(a)(l), which imposed 
automatic disclosure. Rule 11 's 1983 revision became the most controver-
sial change in the Federal Rules' half-century history, thus necessitating its 
fundamental revision in 1993. Rule 26(a)(l)'s proposed revision had been 
the most controversial formal proposal ever to revise the Rules. Signifi-
cant reasons why these provisions proved so troubling were that the rule 
revisors had collected no empirical data on Rule 11 's operation before 
revamping it in 1983,4 while they had minimal empirical information re-
garding automatic disclosure and little experience with the procedure's 
practical application when the revisors proposed to impose disclosure.s 
This time, Judge Paul Niemeyer, Chair of the Advisory Committee, 
appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to investigate the need for revisions 
in the discovery rules.6 That group concomitantly commissioned studies 
of discovery by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), an important research 
arm of the federal courts, and the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil 
Justice (RAND), an expert independent research entity that had recently 
completed an unprecedented analysis of procedures for reducing expense 
and delay in civil litigation under the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 
Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class 
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REY. 664, 677 (1979) (providing Miller's similar view). 
3. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call/or a Morato-
rium, S9 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 8S4-SS (1993); John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the 
Process of Revising the Federal Rules, SS MONT. L. REV. 434 (1994). 
4. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Exam· 
pie of Rule ll, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 192S, 1930 (1989); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for 
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4SS, 4SS-S9 (1993). 
S. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure In Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 
GA. L. REV. l, 17-18 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory J'lformal Dis· 
coveryand the Politics of Rulemaking, 69N.C. L. REV. 79S, 813-21 (1991). 
6. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Allee· 
marie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 24, 2S (1998) [herein· 
after Niemeyer Memorandum]; Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery 
Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. Sl7, S21 (1998) [hereinafter Niemeyer, Here 
We Go Again]. 
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1990.7 Although the Committee had minimal understanding of how sev-
eral major proposed revisions would in fact operate because the measures 
had received little actual application, the Advisory Committee ultimately 
premised the proposals for revision substantially on these studies, which 
included considerable empirical data. 
II. SPECIFIC PROPOSED REVISIONS 
A. Automatic Disclosure 
Numerous, specific proposals to revise the 1993 discovery revisions 
are ironic. Illustrative is the proposed change in automatic disclosure. 
The Advisory Committee principally based its determination to propose 
revision of Federal Rule 26(a) on two perceptions.' One was that the pro-
posal that eventually became the 1993 amendment requiring automatic 
disclosure had been the most controversial proposal to revise the Federal 
Rules in 60 years. For example, practically all segments of the organized 
bar vociferously opposed the proposed disclosure amendment. They be-
lieved that it would impose an additional, unnecessary layer of discovery, 
substantially undermine the traditional adversary system, create certain 
ethical dilemmas, such as conflicting obligations of counsel to the court 
and to clients; and leave unclear precisely what information must be re-
vealed, and thus lead to unnecessarily expensive satellite litigation over 
the proposed revision's meaning.9 
The second perception was that Rule 26(a)'s provision for all ninety-
four federal districts by local rule, judges by order in specific cases, and 
litigants by consent to opt out of the compulsory disclosure requirements, 
complicated federal civil practice by facilitating the application of incon-
sistent disclosure strictures.1° For instance, one-third of the courts rejected 
disclosure altogether, another third eschewed the federal disclosure rule 
and adopted their own local disclosure measures, and one-third subscribed 
7. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Managemenl: Furlher Analysis of lhe Civil Jusllce 
Reform Acl Evalualion Data, 39 B.C. L REv. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging ct nl., An Empirical 
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Praclice Under lhe 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L 
REv. 525 (1998). 
8. See Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
9. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 5, at 28-32; Carl Tobias, Improving lhe 1988 and 1990 Judi-
cial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1612 (1994); Amendments to Fcdernl Rules or Civil 
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 512 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10. The 1993 discovery revisions in Rule 26(b)(2) included similnr opt-out provisions for the 
number or depositions and interrogatories and the length or depositions. 
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to the Federal Rule. 11 
The two perceptions on which the Advisory Committee primarily 
premised the decision to propose revision of Federal Rule 26(a) may actuM 
ally have been misperceptions, however. The realities, apparently, are that 
the 1993 disclosure amendment has proved considerably less controverM 
sial, particularly by operating more effectively, than many critics preM 
dieted, while the revision has fostered the application of fewer conflicting 
local disclosure measures and promoted less balkanization than some fedM 
eral courts observers anticipated. These actualities are manifested in the 
findings of the recent Federal Judicial Center and RAND Corporation 
studies of discovery that the Advisory Committee commissioned. 
The Committee requested that the Federal Judicial Center evaluate 
discovery's expense. The Center received responses from 1200 of the 
2000 attorneys whom it surveyed, and this information enabled the FJC to 
reach numerous conclusions respecting the 1993 disclosure revision. 12 The 
Center determined that disclosure was being broadly employed and was 
apparently having the effects that the Advisory Committee intended. 13 For 
example, "[t]ar more attorneys reported that initial disclosure decreased 
litigation expense, time from filing to disposition, the amount of discovM 
ery, and the number of discovery disputes than said it increased them."14 
The FJC also found that "many more attorneys said initial disclosure inM 
creased overall procedural fairness, the fairness of the case outcome, and 
the prospects of settlement than said it decreased them."15 Multivariate 
analyses which employed docket data confirmed lawyers' perceptions 
regarding reductions in time from filing to resolution, but did not support 
their views that disclosure decreased litigation expense, while ''[r]elatively 
few attorneys reported that disclosure requirements led to motions to comM 
pet, motions for sanctions, or other satellite litigation."16 However, thirtyM 
seven percent of attorneys who had experience with disclosure identified 
11. See DONNA STJENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED 
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (Mar. 30, 1998), reprinted In 182 F.R.D. 
304 (1998). Inconsistency's problems were exacerbated when the federal disclosure revision became 
effective on the same 1993 date that the CJRA required 50 districts to issue civil justice expense and 
delay reduction plans. Only the last minute failure to strike a satisfactory compromise precluded 
passage of a statute which would have prevented that federal revision from taking effect. Because 
numerous districts had seemingly not planned for the provision to become effective, this created much 
additional confusion. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 1613-14. 
12. See Willging et al., supra note 7; Niemeyer, Here We Go Again, supra note 6, at 521. 
13. See Willging et al., supra note 7, at 534-35. 
14. Id. at 535. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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one or multiple difficulties with the procedur~.17 
Ironically, the RAND study yielded somewhat different results. The 
Committee commissioned the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to review a 
broad database that RAND had assembled in conducting the major CJRA 
study and additionally assess this information in ascertaining how well 
discovery functions and how it could be improved.11 The earlier study 
proved inconclusive because RAND selected sample cases before revised 
Rule 26(a)(l) became effective.19 The follow-up examination determined 
that disclosure minimally affected cost and delay. For example, RAND's 
data and evaluations did not "support strongly the policy of mandatory 
early disclosure as a means of significantly reducing lawyer work hours 
and thereby reducing the costs of litigation, or as a means of reducing time 
to disposition.''2° RAND concomitantly observed that "[f]indings from a 
recent survey of about 1000 attorneys by the ABA's Litigation Section" 
resembled the RAND determinations:21 "Analysis of the survey results 
suggests that Rule 26(a)(l) disclosure has not had a significant impact on 
federal civil litigation. . . . The survey provided no evidence that ... dis-
closure had reduced discovery costs or delays" or that it had decreased 
conflict between adversaries in the discovery process.21 Finally, "[d]espite 
the dire warnings of critics of early mandatory disclosure, [RAND] did not 
find any explosion of ancillary litigation and motion practice related to 
disclosure ... .''23 
As to the second perception respecting the application of inconsistent 
discovery requirements, the FJC claimed that an "increasing number of 
voices among both the bench and the bar have asserted that non-
uniformity in the discovery rules-and in the disclosure rules in particu-
lar-is a serious problem and should be resolved.''24 The Center found that 
sixty percent of the lawyers polled think that the adoption of conflicting 
disclosure procedures across districts creates difficulties.25 Ironically, only 
sixteen percent characterize the complications as serious,26 while a mere 
six percent believe that intra-district inconsistency fosters serious difficul-
17. Seeid. 
18. See Kakalik et al., supra note 7; Niemeyer, Here We Go Again, supra note 6, at 522. 
19. See Kakalik et al., supra note 7, at 628; JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OFTIIE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 37-39 (1996). 
20. Kakalik et al., supra note 7, at 678. 
21. Id. at 679. 
22. Id. (quoting KA1lfLEEN L. BLANER ET AL., AMERICAN BAR AssoctATION, MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE SURVEY: FEDERAL RULE 26(A)(l) AFTER ONE YEAR (1996)). 
23. Id. at 658; see also supra notes 9 & 16 and accompanying tcxL 
24. Willging et al., supra note 7, at 541. 
25. Seeid.at542,583. 
26. See id. at 583. 
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ties, and nearly three quarters "think non-uniformity within a district is not 
<? 
a problem."27 
The substance of Rule 26(a)(l)'s proposed revision substantially re-
vises the 1993 disclosure revision, which mandates that a party reveal in-
formation which is "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity."28 
The new proposal would require that a litigant disclose only material 
which favors its position.29 The proposed revision, thus, would narrow, 
and perhaps eviscerate, the 1993 disclosure strictures by demanding the 
exchange of less information.30 
A threshold irony is why the Advisory Committee chose to propose 
this revision today. After all, the FJC and RAND studies indicate that the 
I 993 disclosure amendment has operated efficaciously. Insofar as the 
1993 revision has seemed to work poorly, several phenomena could ex-
plain this apparent ineffectiveness. There may simply be too little experi-
ence with the provision or insufficient evaluation of disclosure's applica-
tion to posit definitive conclusions regarding efficacy, while early criti-
cism of the device might have colored its subsequent implementation. 
Additional experimentation with multiple formulations of the procedure 
may correspondingly enhance appreciation and even lead to the discovery 
of a clearly superior disclosure mechanism. Ironically, the rule revisors 
seemed less concerned about proposing the most effective measure than 
about placating disclosure's critics by diluting the 1993 revision. Even 
were the current need for change clearer, it is uncertain that the new for-
mulation would actually be an improvement. The proposed revision sub-
stitutes wording that might prove ambiguous for terminology that has ac-
quired rather definite meaning. 
Judges concomitantly understand, and are accustomed to applying, 
this phraseology, while lawyers and litigants comprehend, and are used to 
complying with the language. The new articulation could also foster con-
siderable satellite litigation over its meaning and disclosure's scope, 
thereby imposing cost and delay. The rule revisors ironically suggested 
that the proposed revision apply in all cases, although the RAND and FJC 
studies found disclosure to be most problematic in relatively few, complex 
lawsuits. 
The Advisory Committee, therefore, appeared ambivalent about auto-
27. Id. at 583-84. 
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B) (1998); see Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 57-SS 
(Proposed Amendment in Rule 26(a)(I)). 
29. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 57-58 (Proposed Amendment in Ruic 26(a)(I)). 
30. The proposed revision would at least reduce incentives to plead with particularity, thereby 
honoring the Federal Rules' notice pleading regime. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact 
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986). 
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matic disclosure.J1 The Committee seemingly conceded that judges and 
lawyers have not subscribed to the regime instituted by Rule 26(a)(l)'s 
1993 revision and that disclosure has effected little change in discovery, 
even as the Committee appeared unwilling to jettison the idea and at-
tempted to preserve it in a less objectionable fonn.32 Indeed, Judge 
Niemeyer candidly acknowledged that the 
beginning was a strong disclosure rule that could be, and was, de-
feated by local option. The next step is a diluted disclosure rule 
that cannot be defeated by local option. Perhaps in several more 
years the time will come for a strong disclosure rule that cannot be 
defeated by local option.3J 
Ironically, attorneys appear equally unclear about whether disclosure 
warrants change today, and if so, how. For example, the FJC found that 
lawyers consider judicial case management the most promising way to 
decrease discovery difficulties, although eighty-three percent want modifi-
cations in the discovery provisions themselves.34 Forty-one percent of 
those polled favor a "unifonn national rule requiring initial disclosure in 
every district," but twenty-seven percent desire a national rule imposing 
no disclosure and prohibiting local disclosure provisions while thirty per-
cent prefer the status quo.JS Thirty-three percent of respondents want dis-
closure to be made unifonn now; however, twenty-seven percent think that 
revision should await greater experience with the 1993 disclosure amend-
ment.36 
B. Other Major Proposed Revisions 
Several additional major .changes that the Advisory Committee sug-
gested implicate similar ironies. Perhaps most important and illustrative is 
a proposal that involves the scope of discovery.37 For many years, parties 
have been able to secure infonnation that was "relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action.ms The proposed revision would 
narrow the scope of discovery to material that is "relevant to the claim or 
31. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Obstacles in the Search/or Truth; Proposed Amendn:ents to thz 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Hinder Discow!ry in Ways Unnecessary and Unjust, LECiAL nMES, 
July 27, 1998, at21. 
32. See id.; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (listing the factors that vinunlly nil 
segments of the organized bar found objectionable about the 1993 disclosure nmendment). 
33. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 6, al 7. 
34. See Willging el al., supra note 7, at 543. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 592. 
37. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 64-67 (Proposed Amendment in Ruic 26(b)(I)). 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I). 
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defense,"39 while litigants could only acquire information relevant to the 
subject matter upon motion and a showing of good cause.40 The proposal's 
ostensible purposes are to restrict discovery and preclude fishing expedi-
tions by limiting parties to the discovery of matters raised in the pleadings. 
As with disclosure, an initial irony is why the Advisory Committee 
decided to recommend this change now. For instance, the FJC and RAND 
evaluations suggest that discovery is generally working well and that the 
I 993 revisions have been efficacious, particularly by limiting considerable 
contentiousness which attended discovery without prejudicing litigants' 
rights to secure necessary discovery. To the extent that overbroad discov-
ery apparently is a serious problem, judges currently have numerous 
mechanisms for restricting discovery's scope.41 Even were change obvi-
ously warranted today, the new proposal might not constitute improve-
ment. For example, it is unclear that the proposed alteration will actually 
limit the amount of discovery. The proposal would correspondingly re-
place the "subject matter" standard that is familiar to judges, lawyers, and 
litigants and that has a relatively clear meaning with a new criterion which 
could produce much satellite litigation over its interpretation and discov-
ery's breadth, thus increasing expense and delay. Another irony is that the 
proposed measure would apply to all lawsuits, even though the recent FJC 
and RAND studies indicate that overbroad 'discovery principally occurs in 
a rather small number of complicated cases. 
The proposal might also erode the notion of general pleading that has 
prevailed since the I938 adoption of the initial Federal Rules. For in-
stance, the proposed "claim or defense" stricture may require that plain-
tiffs attempt to draft specific pleadings before they can secure material that 
is under defendants' control that would now be available through discov-
ery. The "claim or defense" language could lead plaintiffs to include in 
pleadings broader assertions than the material that they possess supports to 
secure greater discovery, thereby exposing plaintiffs to motions to dismiss 
and motions for Rule I I sanctions.42 
39. Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 64 (Proposed Amendment in Rule 26(b)(I)). 
40. See id. at 64-65 (Proposed Amendment in Rule 26(b)(l)). 
41. As with disclosure, any apparent inefficacy may be attributable to Insufficient experience 
with, or evaluation of, the relevant discovery revisions, while additional experimentation may In· 
crease understanding or prompt discovery of better approaches. 
42. These possible effects on notice pleading ironically differ from that which the disclosure 
proposal may have. See supra note 30. Similar ironies attend proposed imposition of presumptive 
limitations on depositions to one day or seven hours. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 83 
(Proposed Amendment in Rule 30(d)(2)). For example, there is a threshold question of whether this 
modification is necessary. Insofar as deposition length is a problem, courts can now respond under 
Rule 30 or by tailoring temporal restrictions to specific cases' needs in pretrial conferences, while the 
proposal applies to all cases, even though limitations may only be necessary in relatively few. 
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Another similarly ironic proposal involves the notion of cost bearing, 
whereby judges may allow discovery that is disproportionate to a case's 
needs only if the requesting litigant pays for the information sought'° The 
proposed revision might simply be unnecessary, especially given the sub-
stantial authority which courts currently have over discovery practice. 
This proposal is also ironic because it reverses the long-standing premise 
underlying discovery in the American adversary system that parties have 
similar access to proof. The present scheme makes information either 
discoverable or not, an issue which judges ultimately resolve. The pro-
posed revision favors those who possess documents by reducing the party 
that wants information to the undesirable choice of having less material 
than it needs or sustaining potentially large search expenses. The proposal 
concomitantly disadvantages resource-poor litigants while creating per-
verse incentives for parties with economic or political power.'" Finally, 
even if the proposal were formulated to treat the rather rare situations in-
volving discovery abuse45 or document-intensive cases, the proposed revi-
sion applies to all lawsuits. 
III. ADDITIONAL IRONIC IMPLICATIONS 
Additional ironies would accompany implementation of the new dis-
covery proposals. If the proposed rule revisions survive the protracted 
rule revision gauntlet and take effect, the proposals both alone and syner-
gistically could upset the delicate balance between plaintiffs and defen-
dants that is carefully struck by the Advisory Committee in the 1993 revi-
sions. For instance, the proposed changes would narrow the permissible 
scope of discovery and impose search costs on plaintiffs. The balance 
would be altered, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary by Judge 
Niemeyer that the Committee assiduously labored to maintain this bal-
ance.46 
The introduction of new, untested mandates might also require that 
lawyers and litigants file additional papers, that they and judges participate 
in more hearings and conferences, and that judicial officers resolve greater 
numbers of discovery disputes. The imposition of different discovery 
43. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 87·89 (Proposed Amendment in Rule 34(b)). 
44. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 495-98 (1988189). 
45. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Mylh of Pen·asive DlscO\'l!ry Abuse: The Sequel, 39 
B.C. L. REv. 683 (1998) (discussing discovery abuse and rule revisions in light of empirical studies); 
see also Jack Weinstein, Whal Discovery Abuse?: A Commenl on John Se/ear's "The Barris/er and 
the Bomb," 69 B.U. L. REV. 649 (1989) (considering different types of discovery nbuse nnd possible 
solutions). 
46. See Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 6, at 4; see also Cavanagh, supra note 31, at 21-22. 
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mandates and criteria will concomitantly demand that judges comprehend, 
apply, and refine, and that attorneys and litigants discover, understand, and 
conform to the new concepts. These requirements will additionally com-
plicate federal civil practice by expanding the already enormous quantity 
of procedures that counsel and parties must find, apprehend, and satisfy.47 
The measures include provisions in Title 28 of the United States Code and 
substantive statutes, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in local 
procedures which all ninety-four district courts apply. Those local stric-
tures encompass a growing number of local rules that differ from the Fed-
eral Rules and Acts of Congress, some of which districts adopted under 
the Civil Justice Reform Act, as well as a plethora of local requirements, 
such as standing, scheduling, and minute orders, individual-judge proce-
dures· and informal unwritten practices that apply in every court. 
If the proposed rule revisions become effective, the modifications 
would constitute the fourth major set of discovery revisions in the last two 
decades. Their addition to the stunning array of procedures that now gov-
ern federal civil practice may have several detrimental consequences. This 
development would require once again that federal judges master and en-
force, and federal court practitioners and litigants find, understand, and 
comply with discovery revisions and may trigger another prolonged period 
of inconsistent judicial application, satellite litigation, and uncertainty. It 
would concurrently exacerbate systemic overload while additionally test-
. ing, and perhaps exhausting, the tolerance of the bench, bar, and litigants 
for procedural change. The proposed discovery alterations could further 
fragment the already fractured condition of modem federal civil proce-
dure. Finally, most of the phenomena described above would increase 
expense and delay, thus directly contravening Congress's clearly ex-
pressed intent in the CJRA to reduce cost and delay.48 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the consummate irony is that neither the ironies witnessed in 
the recent rule revision process nor in the proposed discovery revisions are 
novel. This rule revision roundelay simply serves as another trenchant 
testament to procedure's cyclical character and as a reminder that the rule 
revisors, American proceduralists, and others interested in reforming the 
rules, as tinkerers, are destined to. "repeat the cycle of revision and relapse 
47. 1 rely in the remainder of this paragraph on Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformat/on In 
Procedural Justice, 11 MINN. L. REV. 375, 379 (1992); Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure 
for the Twenty-First Century (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994); Tobias, supra note 9, at 1601-04. 
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again and again.'049 Indeed, the specter of the rule revisors tinkering with 
the discovery rules for the fourth time in less than twenty years assumes a 
surreal quality and renders even more prescient Justice Lewis Powell's 
explanation for his opposition to the modest 1980 discovery revisions: 
"Congress's acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the 
adoption of genuinely effective reforms.''50 
The recent rule revision experience correspondingly reaffirms the 
aphorism that the "history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the 
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural reforms,"51 
although the measure of a generation has been radically truncated. Of 
course, if the rule revisors "cannot know what the result of any given 
change will be,"52 it is not surprising that they needed to revisit the 1993 
discovery revisions so soon. At least, the revisors apparently learned 
from, and attempted to correct, certain of their predecessors' mistakes. 
After all, the Advisory Committee commissioned several studies before 
recommending revision of the 1993 discovery revisions. Moreover, the 
proposed elimination of opt-out provisions in those revisions would help 
restore uniformity and ameliorate the balkanization that the strictures cre-
ated. This omission would concomitantly enable the rule revisors to re-
furbish their tarnished reputation or perhaps regain some of the respect 
that they lost by evidencing insufficient commitment to the protection and 
preservation of a national procedure code.53 In the final analysis, proce-
dural progress may be ephemeral or at best incremental, frequently ad-
vancing two steps and losing one or moving laterally and even falling 
back.54 
49. Marcus, supra note 30, at 494. 
50. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 1000 (1980) (Powell, J .. 
dissenting); see also Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 WIS. L. REY. 236 (discussing issues 
raised by Rule 11 revision). 
51. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REY. 837, 1030 (1984); see also supra note 2 and nc:c:om-
panying text. 
52. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 631, 677; see also Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. Pm. L. REY. 801 (1995) 
(response to Stephen Yeazell's piece; evaluating modem process and mnking suggestions for trcming 
changes). 
53. See Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: Jn Search of a 77:eory for 
Optional Rules, 14 REY. LmG. 49 (1994) (discussing the Advisoiy Committee's inndcqunte protec-
tion of a national c:ode). But see Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our 
Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994) (defending to some extent the process for promul-
gating rules and asking for the support of the bar). Even if issuance of the recent proposed revisions 
only reflects an effort by the revisers to justify their continued cxistenc:e, it would nt least suggest that 
the revisers are human and subject to the foibles of other bureauc:rntic, entrenched institutions. See 
Mullenix, supra note 45, at 689. 
54. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: 77:e Prospects/or Proeedural Pro~. 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 812-23 (1993). 
